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Over the last two centuries, many countries underwent a democratic transition, moving from au-
tocratic regimes with low popular participation in political decision-making and weak constraints
on the exercise of executive power, to more democratic regimes with broader political participation
and greater limits on the exercise of political power. Figure 1 displays the average democracy score
for a balanced panel of countries since 1800, using a commonly used measure of democracy (the
Polity index). While democratization happened in ﬁts and starts, and did not happen everywhere,
there is a general upward trend: the democratic transition.
The democratic transition partly overlaps with other socioeconomic trends, chieﬂy the demo-
graphic transition, and the process of industrialization and modernization with which it is associ-
ated. As shown in Figure 1, the average level of GDP per has followed the same upward trend as
the democracy index in a balanced panel. What are the links between these various transitions,
and in particular, to what extent did socioeconomic modernization aﬀect the transition toward de-
mocratic institutions? This paper’s main contribution relative to the existing literature is to take
a long view of history, going back to 1870, to untangle the relationships between democratization
and socioeconomic modernization, captured by expanding primary education and rising per capita
income levels. We focus mostly on the question of whether education and income are determinants
of democracy.
We examine the two-way relationship between education (or income) and democracy in a large
panel of countries starting in 1870, using a variety of modern dynamic panel data methods, includ-
ing system GMM. In a ﬁrst step, we address the link from economic development to democracy,
concentrating on two dimensions of socioeconomic modernity, namely GDP per capita and average
years of schooling among the adult population. In a second stage, we investigate the potential
eﬀect of democracy on childhood education, measured by the average years of schooling completed
by young cohorts, as well as on the (log) level or the growth rate of GDP per capita.
This paper is related to a large literature on the dual relationship between economic development
and democracy. One strand of this literature investigated the relationship going from economic
development to democracy. In “A Bill for the More General Diﬀusion of Knowledge” (1779),
Thomas Jeﬀerson argued that education was a cornerstone of democracy: “The most eﬀectual
means of preventing tyranny would be, to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of people at
large, and more especially to give them knowledge of those facts, which history exhibiteth, that,
1possessed thereby of the experience of other ages and countries, they may be enabled to know
ambition under all its shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes”.
This view was shared by other observers throughout history. For instance, Tocqueville (1835)
noted that mass education was a signiﬁcant factor in sustaining the vigor of democracy in the
United States, a leading country in terms of educational attainment over the 19 century:1 “The
education of the people powerfully contributes to the maintenance of the democratic republic.
That will always be so, in my view, wherever education to enlighten the mind is not separated
from that responsible for teaching morality”.2 Building on ideas that go back in time as far
as Aristotle, Lipset (1959) argued in a seminal article that improvements in economic standards
would ultimately lead to democratization: “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances
that it will sustain democracy”. Lipset’s modernization hypothesis received empirical support from
Barro (1999), who found, among other variables, that GDP per capita and primary schooling were
positive determinants of democracy in a large sample of countries spanning the period from 1960
to 1995.
However, in two recent studies, Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2008) revisited and questioned the empir-
ical signiﬁcance of these two major determinants of democracy. They found that, after controlling
for country ﬁxed-eﬀects, GDP per capita was no longer a signiﬁcant determinant of democracy.3 In
other recent studies, Bobba and Coviello (2007) as well as Castello-Climent (2008) re-examined the
evidence. The former isolated a signiﬁcant eﬀect of GDP per capita using a system-GMM estima-
tor, while the latter found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of education attained by the majority of population,
even after controlling for ﬁxed-eﬀects. Finally, Benhabib et al. (2011) recover a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of GDP per capita even when controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects once taking into account the censoring of
the democracy index.
Another strand of the literature explored the consequences of democratization on economic
performance and on the expansion of schooling. The evidence in favor of such eﬀects is mixed. For
instance, Barro (1997) found a nonlinear eﬀect of democracy on growth, with an initial increase in
1See Lindert (2004), Murtin and Viarengo (2010), and Morrisson and Murtin (2009).
2Democracy in America, Volume 1, chapter 9, “The main causes that tend to maintain a democratic republic in
the United States”.
3Using a more micro approach in Kenya, Friedman et al. (2011) also ﬁnd that "increased human capital did not
produce more pro-democratic or secular attitudes and strengthened ethnic identiﬁcation". Whether this holds more
broadly at the level of countries and realized democratic institutions rather than attitudes remains debated.
2growth and a negative relation once some modest level of democracy has been reached. Tavares
and Wacziarg (2001) uncovered a positive eﬀect of democracy on human capital accumulation and
a negative eﬀect on physical capital accumulation, while Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) found a pos-
itive short-term eﬀect of democratization on economic growth, but no eﬀect at longer horizons and
no eﬀect when democracy was sustained for long periods. More speciﬁcally related to education,
Lindert (2004) documented how the extension of the franchise in Europe’s rising democracies grad-
ually led to the introduction of public funding for education over the 19 and 20 centuries, but he
did not provide empirical evidence on the direction of causality between schooling and democracy.
The two-way relationship between education and democracy is at the core of an important
debate on the fundamental sources of economic prosperity. Does education help raise the quality
of institutions as well as productivity, or is an eﬃcient institutional framework a prerequisite for
expanding education levels and economic growth? The issue of the direction of causality between
education and democracy has ignited a debate between the advocates of institutions as the prime
engine of growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002), and the proponents of a diﬀerent thesis, who view
human capital as the root cause of economic development (Glaeser et al., 2004, 2007, Glaeser and
Campante, 2009). Sorting out the respective eﬀects of democracy and education upon each other
would shed some light on this broader debate.
This paper makes three contributions. First, using the Morrisson and Murtin (2009) dataset
of educational attainment in 74 countries since 1870, we ﬁnd strong empirical support for the
modernization hypothesis. Second, we show that primary schooling, more so than GDP per capita,
has been a major trigger of the democratic transition over 1870-2000. Third, using state-of-the-art
dynamic panel data techniques such as system GMM, we address the issue of reverse causality and
ﬁnd no robust evidence of an eﬀect of democracy on education or GDP per capita.
Section 2 describes empirical facts related to democracy and development over the 1870-2000
period. Section 3 tests the modernization hypothesis using a long time series, while section 4
addresses the reverse relationship, from democracy to education and income. The last section
concludes.
2 Democracy and Development, 1870-2000
In this section, we describe the data and take a bird’s-eye view of trends in democracy, income
and schooling since 1870. Since diﬀerences across countries are central to our analysis, we focus on
3convergence eﬀects and on three particular periods: 1870-1910, 1910-1960, and 1960-2000. These
broadly delineate the two periods of globalization and the protectionist period of the interwar years.
The full sample is composed of 70 countries spanning every continent, of which 19 countries form
a balanced panel starting in 1870.4 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
2.1 Democracy
Our main measure of democracy is the combined polity score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2008), rescaled between 0 (full autocracy) and 1 (full democracy). This widely-used
index consists of underlying components capturing key characteristics of executive recruitment,
constraints on executive authority, and the degree of political competition. We plot the world
distribution of democracy scores in Figure 2 (unbalanced panel) and Figure 3 (balanced panel).
Boxplots represent the 25 and 75 percentiles as well as the median of the distribution. These two
ﬁgures illustrate an overall increase in democracy between 1870 and 1920, followed by a marked
decrease until the Second World War. The immediate postwar period witnessed a new rise in
democracy that lasted until the end of our period in the balanced panel. In the unbalanced panel,
democracy stagnated or even regressed between 1960 and 1980 but rose again since then. The world
distribution of democracy widened from 1930 onwards, while at the end of the period, cross-country
diﬀerences in democracy fell dramatically.
The latter observation is related to global inequality in democracy: Has democracy converged
across countries over time? Consistent with ﬁndings in Barro (1999) for the postwar period, results
from the full sample show that democracy has indeed converged within any of our three subperiods,
at roughly the same pace. Indeed, when calculated on an annual basis, the speed of convergence
of democracy happens to be equal to 47% over the 1870-1910 period, 34% in 1910-1960 and 37%
in 1960-2000.5 The three graphs at the top of Figure 4 illustrate these results.
How can (beta) convergence in democracy levels be reconciled with the increase in cross-country
4When studying the relationship between democracy and income, the maximal sample size is 69 countries.
5The annual convergence rate is given by −() where  is the estimated coeﬃcient of initial democracy
in an absolute convergence regression, and  is the length of the period over which the diﬀerence in democracy is
calculated. There are respectively 34, 39 and 59 countries involved in the latter computation. In the balanced panel,
the results are almost identical: a convergence process has taken place in the 1910-1960 and 1960-2000 periods at
an annual rate of respectively 32% and 36%.I n t h e ﬁrst period, convergence occurred but only among a club of
advanced democracies.
4democracy inequality observed between 1930 and the mid-1980s (sigma divergence)? Beta conver-
gence entails inequality reduction if shocks aﬀecting democracy are stationary over time. But as
Figure 2 and 3 as well as Table 1 make clear, the occurrence of two world wars and the associated
political turmoil have signiﬁcantly widened the distribution of democracy. Hence, the evolution of
democracy scores is driven by a convergence eﬀect, but heteroskedastic time-speciﬁcs h o c k sh a v e
considerably widened the distribution.
2.2 Income and Schooling
We capture economic development and modernization either by the level of GDP per capita or
by average years of schooling among the adult population, these variables being highly correlated
among themselves both across countries and over time. GDP per capita comes from Maddison
(2006) while average years of schooling is from Morrisson and Murtin (2009). The latter have
constructed a historical database on average years of schooling covering 74 countries since 1870.
They combined data on total enrollments in primary, secondary and tertiary schooling with age
pyramids, in order to calculate enrollment rates and the average number of years of schooling among
the adult population.6 Morrisson and Murtin (2010) cross-checked these series with historical data
on literacy, ﬁnding a high level of consistency even at the beginning of the period. In other words,
these are the most comprehensive historical data on educational attainment across countries and
time available to researchers.
An extensive literature describes the global evolution of key aggregate socio-economic variables
over the 19 and 20 centuries, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to comment extensively
on all these well-known transformations.7 Let us simply recall a few facts, mirrored by elementary
statistics provided by Table 1: In broad terms, modern economic growth took oﬀ in Western Europe
in the ﬁrst half of the 19 century, and to varying degrees spread to Asia and Latin America at the
6Before 1960, the main source for education data is Mitchell (2003)’s statistical yearbooks. After 1960, they relied
on the Cohen and Soto (2007) series, adjusted for diﬀerential mortality across educational groups.
7A short list of references might include Bourguignon-Morrisson (2002), describing the world income distribution
since 1820; Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor (2005, 2011), analyzing the joint variations of income and population over
the long run as well as the structural forces that have triggered the Industrial Revolution; O’Rourke and Williamson
(1999) and Hatton and Williamson (2005), focusing on the eﬀect of globalization on economic performance; Morrisson
and Murtin (2009, 2010), describing the spread of education at a global level; Murtin (2011) investigating the
determinants of the demographic transition over the 20
 century.
5beginning of the 20 century as well as to Africa after Second World War. In terms of education,
schooling was a quasi-exclusive feature of the Western world in 1870, but Eastern Europe as well as
some fast-developing Asian countries, most notably Japan, have caught up over the 20 century.
A polarized schooling distribution in 1870 turned to a substantially heterogeneous distribution
in 2000: At the top, high-income countries reaching mass enrollment in primary and secondary
schooling with growing enrolment in tertiary education. In the middle of the world distribution,
Latin America, the Middle-East and North-Africa as well as most of developing Asian countries
achieving mass schooling enrollment in primary and partly in secondary school. At the bottom,
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have barely achieved extensive levels of enrollment in primary
schooling today.
In terms of diﬀerences across countries, economic development does not reﬂect the convergence
in democracy described above. As is well-known, income inequality across countries has increased
throughout the 20 century, except among a convergence club of relatively high-income countries
before the First World War and after the Second World War. Similarly, there has not been any
convergence in average education in any period, except among two clubs of advanced countries
during the ﬁrst and second globalization periods (see Morrisson and Murtin, 2009). These two
facts are clearly illustrated by the second and third panels of Figure 4. We now examine the
correlation between education, income and democracy in a more quantitative fashion.
2.3 The Joint Distribution of Democracy and Development
Figure 5 presents a kernel estimation of the bivariate distribution of democracy and average years
of schooling within four diﬀerent sub-periods: 1870-1970, 1920-1940, 1950-2000 and 1980-2000.8
A similar graph can be obtained with log GDP per capita instead of education, and results are
qualitatively identical. Some interesting facts emerge: On the eve of the twentieth century, the
bivariate distribution of democracy and schooling was clearly bimodal, splitting rich and educated
democracies on the one hand from poor and low education autocracies on the other. Over the next
sub-period, a large share of initial autocracies witnessed economic growth and joined the club of
democracies, ensuring a strong positive correlation between democracy and income or education.
After 1950, and even more visibly after 1980, there have been two distinct groups of unequal size,
8We have used an Epanchenikov kernel with bandwidth adjusted to the ﬁnite sample size. We used the balanced
panel of countries, but results are qualitatively the same with the unbalanced panel.
6poor and low-educated autocracies on the one hand and rich and highly-educated democracies on
the other. Among the latter, the correlation between democracy and education or income has
ﬂattened out as countries had already reached high levels of democracy in 1950 while experiencing
continuous economic development. In sum, this evidence is consistent with the idea that both
development and democracy levels experienced a transition from a regime of low education, low
income and low democracy to a regime of high education, high income, and high democracy. In
what follows we seek to disentangle the directions of causality accounting for this transition.
3 Testing the Modernization Hypothesis Over the Long Run
3.1 Democracy and Income
We begin with the following econometric framework to test the modernization hypothesis:
 =  +  + −1 +  (1)
where  is an index of democracy in country  in period , ranging from 0 to 1,  and  are
respectively country-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁce ﬀects,  an idiosyncratic shock and  av a r i a b l e
that proxies for economic development such as log GDP per capita or average education among the
adult population, lagged one period. As a benchmark, we consider a 10-year time span between
subsequent observations (i.e. in our panel a period is deﬁned as 10 years). Controlling for country-
level ﬁxed eﬀects () allows us to partial out the eﬀect of country speciﬁc, time invariant factors,
so we estimate equation (1) with a simple ﬁxed eﬀects estimator.
One may also include the lagged value of the dependent variable in the regression, since the
political structure of a country changes slowly over time, as the introduction or the modiﬁcation of
laws, constitutions and the changes in political regimes meet resistance (Barro, 1999). Consequently,
the democracy score is highly time persistent. We account for autocorrelation in the dependent
variable using a dynamic panel model:
 =  +  + −1 + −1 +  (2)
Since this is now a dynamic panel data model, ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is unsuitable. The speci-
ﬁcation in equation (2) can instead be estimated with GMM methods developed respectively by
Arellano and Bond (1991) (henceforth AB) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (henceforth BB). Both
estimators diﬀerence away time-invariant, country speciﬁce ﬀects, and both rely on the dynamic
7structure of the model for identiﬁcation. In particular, the AB estimator uses lagged levels of the
independent variables as instruments for the current diﬀerences, while the BB estimator involves
additional moment conditions, which amount to using lagged diﬀerences as instruments for current
levels. The AB estimator, however, has been found to be subject to small sample bias, so the
BB estimator, which partly avoids this problem, is the preferred current estimator in the litera-
ture. Throughout, we report estimates based on both the AB and BB estimators, noting that BB
estimates are likely to be more reliable.9
Table 2 focuses on log GDP per capita as the main explanatory variable and displays the esti-
mates of equations (1) and (2) over the whole period as well as over three sub-periods, 1960-2000,
1930-2000 and 1870-2000, enabling us to gauge the inﬂuence of time-speciﬁc sample selection. Re-
garding the choice of countries, we ﬁrst use the whole sample, then a sample that excludes countries
already at the maximum level of democracy as of the initial year, and ﬁnally the more restricted
balanced panel. Thus, Table 2 examines the relationships between democracy and development
using a full range of econometric procedures, time-periods, and country samples.
The overall conclusion is as follows: Among 36 speciﬁcations, 24 involve lagged income having a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Using a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator (henceforth FE), lagged income
is signiﬁcant in 11 out of 12 cases. It is not signiﬁcant over the 1960-2000 period, the time period
emphasized by Acemoglu et al. (2008), but it is signiﬁcant in all other sub-periods and highly
signiﬁcant over the whole period. AB estimates on lagged income are only signiﬁcant in 3 of 12
regressions. However, as already noted this estimator is aﬄicted by problems of weak instruments
(as demonstrated in Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009, among others). This is a major reason why the BB
estimator was developed. Crucially, lagged income is signiﬁcant 10 times out of 12 when using BB,
the state of the art dynamic panel estimator, conﬁrming with a longer panel results found in Bobba
and Coviello (2007). Moreover, BB estimation passes all of the speciﬁcation tests when using the
full sample, even though a limited number of instruments was chosen in order to avoid instruments
proliferation problems.10
9For further details on the AB and BB estimators, and of their econometric properties in the context of cross-
country dynamic panel applications, see Hauk and Wacziarg (2009).
10As described by Anderson and Sorenson (1996), Bowsher (2002) and Roodman (2009), instruments proliferation
generate implausibly low values of Hansen tests of instruments exogeneity. This is because the size of the variance
matrix of the moments is too large to be estimated accurately within a ﬁnite sample. Reducing the number of
instruments therefore limits this problem. We also use Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample correction of standard errors
8A feature that could explain the non-signiﬁcance of some estimates in the previous exercise
is sample selection. Countries already at the "democratic frontier" at initial date are unlikely to
experience large decreases in democracy (even if this has actually been observed several times in
history, notably after the First World War).11 To gauge the inﬂuence of this group of countries, we
ran the former regressions while excluding the countries that were already at the maximum level
of democracy at the initial date. As shown in the second part of Table 2, excluding these countries
from the analysis has an important eﬀect on the results, as the 1960-2000 ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates
and the two most recent AB estimates of the coeﬀcient on log per capita income become signiﬁcant.
Sample composition could further aﬀect our results as the sample does not remain ﬁxed over
time. In practice, countries join the sample at their date of independence, but many young coun-
tries have experienced erratic political processes, including declines in democracy in some cases.
Their inclusion in the sample could create composition eﬀects and spuriously aﬀect the long-term
interpretation of our results. In the last part of Table 2, we therefore restrict the sample to a
balanced panel of nineteen countries observed since 1870. Within this sample, lagged GDP per
capita appears to be a strongly signiﬁcant determinant of democracy in 7 out of 12 speciﬁcations.12
In terms of magnitudes, in the BB regression using the full sample over the 1870-2000 period,
the coeﬃcient of lagged income is equal to 0146. This implies that doubling GDP per capita
entails closing 10% of the gap between the most dictatorial regime and the most democratic one.13
Recalling from Table 1 that available countries had an average GDP per capita of $1523 in 1870
and $8465 in 2000, started at a level of democracy equal to 041 a n de n d e du pa tal e v e le q u a lt o
077, this means that economic development accounts for 70% of the progress of democracy within
this sample.14 A similar calculation over the 1960-2000 period, over which sample composition is
less variable, suggests that economic development accounts for 80% of observed democratization.
in order to increase robustness.
11In statistical terms, this raises the issue of the measurement of democracy, which is proxied by a bounded variable.
Even if some countries have already converged towards the maximum reported level of democracy at the initial date,
institutions have kept on evolving, most likely improving, within these countries. Benhabib et al. (2011) account for
the censoring of the democracy variable and ﬁnd, similarly to us, a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on log GDP per capita.
12However, in this restricted sample BB estimation conducted over the 1870-2000 period fails to pass the Arellano-
Bond ﬁrst-order autocorrelation test.
13As 0146 × (2) = 0101
14Since: 0146 × (84651523)(077 − 0414) = 0703
9These ﬁndings diﬀer from Acemoglu et al. (2008) who showed that the relationship between
democracy and lagged income is statistically insigniﬁcant when calculated over the 20 century,
and turns signiﬁcant only over the very long term, say between 1500 and 2000. Figure 6 best
illustrates their result. It shows the seemingly null correlation between the change in the Polity IV
score of democracy and growth in GDP per capita between 1900 and 2000.
The non-signiﬁcant correlation depicted in Figure 6 can be explained by the omission of the
initial level of democracy from the regression. Indeed, the pairwise correlation between growth
of GDP per capita and the change in democracy can be spuriously contaminated by unobserved
variables. Among those, the initial level of democracy is a potential candidate, since, as described
earlier, convergence in democracy occurred in every periods. The negative correlation between the
change and the initial level of democracy might therefore contaminate the relationship between
the change in democracy and per capita GDP growth. Table 3 presents a simple set of regressions
where the dependent variable is the change in democracy between 1900 and 2000, while explanatory
variables include per capita GDP growth (column I), then adding initial democracy (column II),
and ﬁnally adding initial log GDP per capita (column III). As is clear from these simple cross-
country regressions, per capita GDP growth is highly signiﬁcant once the initial level of democracy
is included in the speciﬁcation, as in columns II and III. This suggests that the non-signiﬁcance of
per capita GDP growth in column I results from omitted variable bias arising from the exclusion of
the initial level of democracy. Interestingly, both the initial level and the growth in GDP per capita
bear a signiﬁcant positive association with the change in democracy over the period, suggesting the
presence of both accumulation and level eﬀects.
The divergence in results with Acemoglu et al. (2008) can also in part be explained by the
diﬀerence in the time span used across the two analyses. Acemoglu et al. (2008) consider 25 year
time spans, while the present study focuses on decennial time spans. When using a longer time
span of 30 years, we also found that lagged income was insigniﬁc a n t .T h i si sm o s t l ye x p l a i n e db y
a smaller sample size. Indeed, regressing democracy on log GDP per capita lagged 30 years, but
using a 10 years time span as in our study, we still found a highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on lagged
income.15 Whether a 10 years or 25 year time span is more appropriate is left at the appreciation
of the reader, although simple econometric intuition would plead for a larger sample size - it is not
15In this case we were using a sample of 456 observations and 67 countries rather than a sample of 156 observations
and 61 countries. Using log GDP per capita lagged 10 years while using a 30 years time span, we also found a
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on lagged income at the 10 percent conﬁdence level.
10surprising that results would become weaker with a smaller sample.
We now examine the ﬁndings obtained with a diﬀerent proxy for economic development: edu-
cation.
3.2 Democracy and Education
In this subsection, we analyze the determinants of democracy focusing on education. We consider
years of education at various levels (primary, secondary and tertiary), focusing particularly on
average years of primary schooling in the adult population (aged 15 years and older).
Columns IV-VII of Table 3 display cross-sectional regressions of change in democracy between
1900 and 2000 on the corresponding change in mean years of primary schooling among the adult
population, initial democracy and initial average years of primary schooling. We ﬁnd qualitatively
the same results as for income. The change in primary schooling is highly signiﬁcant in column
IV and remains signiﬁcant at the 5 percent conﬁdence level in columns VI and VII once other
explanatory variables are added. Controlling for the whole set of income and education-related
variables as in column VII, we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for both the changes in log
GDP per capita and average primary schooling, as well as for the initial level of primary schooling.
The relationship between democracy and primary schooling is illustrated by Figure 7, which depicts
as i g n i ﬁcant and positive correlation between changes in democracy and changes in average years
of primary schooling between 1900 and 2000.
Returning to higher data frequency (using a panel with decade averages), Table 4 reports results
that can be directly compared to those of Table 2. In this setting, we estimatee q u a t i o n s( 1 )a n d( 2 )
using various samples and econometric methods, replacing log GDP per capita by average years of
primary schooling. Again, in 24 out of 36 speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on lagged primary schooling
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (and in 23 cases, at the 5% level). Crucially,
in 11 out of 12 cases, BB estimates display signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients (in 10 of those cases,
at the 1% signiﬁcance level).16 Fixed eﬀects estimates also generally display a positive eﬀect of
primary schooling on democracy, as 10 out of 12 coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. As
before, AB estimates are less signiﬁcant and more volatile, which again can be explained by the
well-known weak instruments problem plaguing this estimator.
16The BB estimator passes speciﬁcation tests in 8 out of the above 11 cases. As before the Arellano-Bond auto-
correlation tests are not satisﬁed in the balanced sample.
11In terms of magnitudes, the BB coeﬃcient on primary schooling is equal to 0074 for the full
sample over the whole period, entailing an increase in 0074 × 6=0 44 points in the democracy
score when the country shifts from complete illiteracy to full literacy (assuming a duration of 6
years for primary schooling). Since, in the full sample, the average democracy score has increased
by 036 points, and average primary schooling by 23 years between 1870 and 2000, this means that
0074 × 23036 = 47% of the average variation in democracy in high-income countries between
1870 and 2000 can be accounted for by the increase in primary schooling and associated literacy
achievements. Over 1960-2000, this magnitude rises to 54%.
To see if primary schooling is the main variable driving democracy or if education at other levels
of attainment matters separately, we reran the regressions (over the full sample) using secondary
and tertiary schooling. We also ran a horse race between primary, secondary and tertiary schooling.
Results are presented in Table 5. As in Tables 2 and 4, most of Hansen speciﬁcation tests for AB
regressions fail, so we rule out the AB estimator in the remaining sections of the paper, and we
f o c u so nb o t ht h eF Ea n dB Be s t i m a t o r s .T h eﬁrst panel of Table 5 conﬁrms that average years of
primary schooling is a strongly signiﬁcant determinant of democracy in both FE and BB regressions,
and across all periods. All speciﬁcation tests are valid and point-estimates of primary schooling are
consistent across all regressions. By contrast, we ﬁnd little evidence that secondary and tertiary
schooling matter much for democracy - the signs on these variables are sometimes negative, often
insigniﬁcant, and generally unstable across time periods and estimation methods. We do ﬁnd
that, using the BB estimator, secondary schooling consistently turns out positive and signiﬁcant
irrespective of the time period, with satisfactory speciﬁcation tests, but this is not robust to using
the simpler FE estimator
One of the main ﬁndings of this paper is the horserace between education measures at various
levels, in the bottom panel of Table 5: When disaggregating average years of schooling into its three
main components, primary schooling "wins out" - it bears a consistently positive and statistically
signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcient while the other measures of schooling are generally insigniﬁcant
statistically.17
17We also ran regressions using the total number of years of education in the adult population (the sum of primary,
secondary and tertiary). We found mixed evidence that the overall stock of education was signiﬁcantly associated
with democracy: this held in only 14 of the 36 speciﬁcations corresponding to those in Table 4. Results were strongest
using the state-of-the-art BB estimator irrespective of the period under consideration, with 8 signiﬁcant estimates
out of 12. This held when excluding initial democracies but not when focusing on the balanced panel only. Results
12These results suggest that progress in democracy is achieved mostly when countries are still in
their infancy in terms of educational development. In other words, increased political participation
might involve the transition between illiteracy and literacy rather than further developments of
secondary schooling and higher education, which often take place in already mature societies.
What matters for democracy is the average number of years of primary schooling in the adult
population rather than the average total number of years of schooling. Since higher education
reached mass enrolment rates in high-income countries over the last quarter of the 20 century,
when democracy was already well-established, it is not surprising that higher education cannot
explain the emergence of democracy.
3.3 Channels of Democratization: Income or Primary Education?
The results discussed above provide empirical support for a central issue in political economy: The
quantitative evidence demonstrates that economic development and modernization, captured either
by log GDP per capita or average years of primary schooling, are strongly signiﬁcant determinants
of democracy. This result is robust to controlling for country ﬁxed-eﬀects, accounting for persistence
in the dependent variable and instrumenting using lagged explanatory variables in both levels and
ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Table 6 investigates which of the two variables - log GDP per capita or average years of primary
schooling - has the greatest explanatory power using the full sample of countries. Primary education
appears to be a more robust determinant. Indeed, it is signiﬁcant in all 8 speciﬁcations, while lagged
log GDP per capita is signiﬁcant in 3 regressions out of 8. Focusing on FE regressions, lagged income
and primary education are both highly signiﬁcant over any period, except for lagged income in the
1960-2000 period. Focusing on the BB estimator, we ﬁnd satisfactory speciﬁcation tests in all cases,
and a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for primary schooling over every period. In contrast, lagged GDP per
capita is never signiﬁcant when using the BB estimator and controlling for primary schooling. The
coeﬃcient on the latter variable over the 1960-2000 is equal to 0107, explaining about 78% of
changes in democracy observed over the same period.
for overall educational attainment are available upon request.
133.4 Robustness Analysis
In unreported work, we have run robustness checks.18 First, we deﬁned subperiods diﬀerently, and
found that our main results still hold over the two globalization periods (1870-1910 and 1960-2000)
and the period of retreat from globalization that corresponds roughly to the Interwar period (1910-
1960). Using a BB estimator, we found that primary education has been the key determinant
of democracy in all these sub-periods. In terms of the magnitude of the eﬀect, it is comparable
across all three sub-periods and similar to the one described above. Interestingly, income has not
been a signiﬁcant determinant of democracy until the postwar period. Second, we found that our
results are unchanged when using a diﬀerent democracy index, namely the Freedom House indices
of political rights and civil liberties over the period 1960-2000.
4 From Democracy to Modernity?
4.1 From Democracy to Education
This section focuses on the reverse causality from democracy to economic development. We start
by examining the link from democracy to schooling. Two classes of theories aiming to explain the
historical increase in schooling have emerged from past studies. The ﬁrst one is again linked to
Lipset’s modernization hypothesis, as it emphasizes the role played by economic development and
technological progress. It includes Uniﬁed Growth Theory (Galor and Weil, 1999, 2000, Galor,
2011), which explains the take-oﬀ in public schooling among advanced countries by the rising
demand for skills at the onset of the second Industrial Revolution. To say this diﬀerently, the spread
of education originates from "the race between education and technological progress" (Tinbergen,
1975) that started in the second half of the 19 century.
The second class of theories highlights the role played by cultural or religious factors (Weber,
1905, Becker and Woessmann, 2006) and institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). In particular,
Lindert (2004, chapters 5 and 15) documents how the gradual extension of the suﬀrage as well
as decentralization fostered the development of a publicly funded mass education system among
advanced countries over the 19 century. He concludes that "there is a strong link from the spread
of political voice to the rise of tax-based primary education" (Lindert, 2004, chapter 15, p.50).
According to the "Lindert’s hypothesis", democratization should entail an increase in schooling.
18The corresponding empirical results are available upon request.
14In this subsection we aim to formally test whether educational attainment of young cohorts
is determined by economic progress or by democratization, while accounting for cross-country
diﬀerences in cultural factors. Measurement issues are addressed as follows:
First, the educational attainment of the youth is deﬁned as the average years of schooling of
pupils aged between 5 and 14. In practice, the latter variable is proxied by the observed average
value of schooling among the cohort aged between 25 and 34 years twenty years later (i.e. observed
at time +2).19 It is worth noting than at date +1, the latter cohort corresponds to the population
aged between 15 and 24 years, in other words pupils in mid-secondary or at the end of tertiary
schooling. Consequently, changes in democracy taking place between two subsequent observations
of our panel should aﬀect the whole spectrum of pupils in school.
Second, standards of economic development are proxied by two variables, namely log GDP per
capita and average years of schooling of the adult population. Regressing the ﬂow of education (i.e.
education of young generations) on the stock of education (i.e. education of the adult population)
could generate spurious correlations if the ﬂow variable displays some autocorrelation. To avoid
this problem, we control for the lagged dependent variable. Finally, country ﬁxed-eﬀects account
for time-invariant factors such as religion or culture. We assess the following dynamic panel data
model using the same instrumentation techniques as before:
 =  +  + −1 +  +  +  +  (3)
where  is average years of schooling completed by the cohort aged between 25 and 34 twenty
years later,  the democracy score,  average years of schooling of population older than 15,
 log GDP per capita,  and  respectively country and time ﬁxed-eﬀects. In particular, this
speciﬁcation allows to test whether 0, namely whether Lindert’s hypothesis holds holding ﬁxed
past increases in schooling and improvements in living standards.20
Table 7 presents the results of OLS estimates (imposing  =0and  =0 ), panel ﬁxed eﬀects
( 6=0and  =0 ) and BB estimation, controlling or not for the level of development. We ran two
sets of regressions, one spanning the whole period, the other focusing on the period 1960-2000. In
19This variable is taken from the data on education by age borrowed from the same sources than those underlying
Morrisson and Murtin (2009).
20In results available upon request, we introduced a cubic in the level of democracy to detect potentially non-linear
eﬀects as suggested by Lindert (2004). We could not ﬁnd any evidence of non-linearity.
15order to eliminate some persistence (unit roots) in the residuals, all variables were ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
in BB regressions, and as a result, Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests on the BB residuals and
the Hansen test of joint exogeneity of the instruments were satisﬁed in all cases.
Overall, weak results arise regarding the potential role of democracy as a determinant of human
capital. Over the 1870-2000 period, democracy is a signiﬁcant determinant of average years of
schooling attained by young cohorts in OLS and FE regressions in columns I and III, but it is no
longer signiﬁcant once the level of development is controlled for, as columns II and IV demonstrate.
In BB regressions, democracy is never signiﬁcant (columns V and VI). Over the 1960-2000 period,
democracy is signiﬁcant in one OLS regression (Column VII) but switches sign when other variables
are introduced (Column VIII). In FE and BB estimation, it is never signiﬁcant (columns IX through
XII). In sum, democracy is a positive and signiﬁcant determinant of schooling attained by young
cohorts in only 3 speciﬁcations out of 12. When the level of development is controlled for, it is never
signiﬁcant among the 6 corresponding speciﬁcations. Hence, we ﬁnd little evidence that democracy
leads to higher educational attainment.
4.2 From Democracy to Income
Turning to the relationship between GDP per capita and democracy, we simply run our dynamic
panel data speciﬁcations, running income as a function of lagged democracy and (where appropri-
ate), lagged income. In other words, we "reverse" the baseline speciﬁcation of Section 3.
We ﬁnd no robust eﬀect of the lagged level of democracy on log per capita income. As reported
in Table 8, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between log GDP per capita and lagged democracy
when using FE. However, this correlation vanishes once we control for the lagged level of log GDP
per capita and use either AB or BB estimators, whatever the period and country sample. Similarly,
in results available upon request, we ﬁnd that growth of GDP per capita and lagged democracy
are never signiﬁcantly associated, whatever the period and country sample and independently
from whether we control for lagged per capita GDP growth (AB and BB estimators) or not (FE
estimators).
In sum, the empirical evidence suggest that the level of income is more likely to be a determinant
of the level of democracy than the other way around once we control for income persistence, and
that the level of democracy has hardly been a signiﬁcant determinant of economic growth over the
20 century.
165C o n c l u s i o n
Schumpeter (1942, chapter 22) argued that “modern democracy rose along with capitalism, and
incausalconnectionwithit(...). Democracyinthesenseofourtheoryofcompetitiveleadership
presided over the process of political and institutional change by which the bourgeoisie reshaped,
and from its own point of view rationalized, the social and political structure that preceded its
ascendancy(...). Moderndemocracyisaproductofthecapitalistprocess”. Thispaperprovides
empirical support for this view. Using modern dynamic panel estimation methods and long run
historical data going back to 1870, we documented an empirical link from the level of development,
especially the level of primary schooling, to democracy. Investigating reverse causality from democ-
racy to the educational attainment of young cohorts over the long run, we found little evidence
of a positive and signiﬁcant link. While democracies may not entail a larger quantity of schooling
among young cohorts, they may be conducive to higher educational quality, for instance in the form
of higher teacher-pupils ratio or higher expenditure per pupil at each stage of education. We leave
this question open for future research.
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Figure 1 - The Democratic and Economic Transitions 
note: the balanced sample is composed of Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States over the 1800-2000 
period. Log GDP per capita is taken from Maddison (2006) and democracy is the Polity index. Missing 
observations are interpolated.  
   
   
Figure 2 – Distribution of the Democracy Index Over Time - Unbalanced Panel of 70 Countries 
   
Figure 3 - Distribution of the Democracy Index Over Time - Balanced Panel of 19 Countries  



















Figure 6 – Change in Democracy and Economic Growth 1900-2000 
 
 
Figure 7 – Change in Democracy and Average Years of Primary Schooling 1900-2000  
TABLES 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
1870 1910 1960 2000 1870 1910 1960 2000
Democracy
average 0.41 0.60 0.58 0.77 0.44 0.61 0.64 0.95
coefficient of variation 0.74 0.52 0.65 0.36 0.73 0.56 0.62 0.09
p25 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.65 0.25 0.30 0.15 0.90
p75 0.65 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.95 1.00 1.00
GDP per capita
average 1523 2913 3825 8465 1489 2947 6109 14602
coefficient of variation 0.52 0.48 0.82 0.98 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.48
p25 737 1694 1378 1433 719 1794 3072 7218
p75 2003 4064 6230 16010 1876 4198 8753 20321
Average Years of Schooling
Total
average 2.80 3.98 4.17 7.28 2.53 4.09 5.95 9.51
coefficient of variation 0.72 0.63 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.64 0.46 0.25
Primary
average 2.16 3.00 3.07 4.45 2.02 3.18 4.24 5.49
coefficient of variation 0.72 0.60 0.64 0.33 0.73 0.58 0.35 0.12
Secondary
average 0.61 0.94 1.02 2.44 0.49 0.87 1.57 3.43
coefficient of variation 0.98 0.91 1.09 0.68 1.01 0.99 0.83 0.46
Tertiary
average 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.39 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.59
coefficient of variation 1.17 1.00 1.11 0.89 1.06 0.90 0.96 0.65
N
1 27 32 59 69 19 19 19 19
Full sample Balanced sample
1Number of countries with information available on democracy, average years of schooling as well as 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Table 3 – OLS results using long-differences between 1900 and 2000 –  
Log GDP per Capita and Primary Schooling 
 
I II III IV V VI VII
change in log GDP per capita 0.009 0.066* 0.118*** 0.088**
(0.129) (0.035) (0.032) (0.039)
initial level of log GDP per capita 0.108*** 0.065
(0.022) (0.045)
initial level of the score of democracy -0.887*** -0.997*** -0.910*** -0.984*** -1.021***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.052) (0.041) (0.026)
change in average years of primary  0.140*** -0.004 0.086*** 0.100***
schooling (0.038) (0.018) (0.016) (0.025)
initial level of average years of primary  0.087*** 0.088***
schooling (0.011) (0.027)
R
2 0.00 0.95 0.97 0.27 0.9 0.97 0.99
N 28 28 28 35 35 35 28
note: robust standard errors. * (respectively ** and ***) stand for significance at the 10 (resp. 5 and 1) percent level.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Table 5 – Democracy and Average Years of Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Schooling
FE BB FE BB FE BB FE BB
Primary
D(-1) 0.470*** 0.449*** 0.355*** 0.291***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.091) (0.094)
0.048*** 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.083*** 0.076** 0.108***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.034) (0.021)
N 657 613 583 540 465 427 335 310
N countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
N instruments 83 78 73 56
AB1 statistics 0 0 0 0
AB2 statistics 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.86
Hansen statistics 0.88
Secondary
D(-1) 0.609*** 0.606*** 0.500*** 0.465***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.118)
S(-1) -0.002 0.058*** -0.014 0.059*** -0.059** 0.066*** -0.116*** 0.081***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.029) (0.018) (0.038) (0.026)
N 657 613 583 540 465 427 335 310
N countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
N instruments 83 78 73 56
AB1 statistics 0 0 0 0
AB2 statistics 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.55
Hansen statistics 0.85 0.74 0.40 0.12
Tertiary
D(-1) 0.741*** 0.733*** 0.600*** 0.638***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.095) (0.115)
H(-1) -0.147 0.139 -0.197* 0.156 -0.297*** 0.282** -0.321** 0.248*
(0.097) (0.098) (0.101) (0.102) (0.114) (0.126) (0.137) (0.144)
N 657 613 583 540 465 427 335 310
N countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
N instruments 83 78 73 56
AB1 statistics 0 0 0 0
AB2 statistics 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.45
Hansen statistics 0.76 0.63 0.39 0.20
All
D(-1) 0.517*** 0.494*** 0.373*** 0.317***
(0.085) (0.098) (0.105) (0.108)
P(-1) 0.042** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.070** 0.054** 0.067** 0.062* 0.087***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028)
S(-1) 0.015 -0.002 0.010 0.000 -0.026 0.016 -0.105** 0.029
(0.028) (0.050) (0.030) (0.052) (0.036) (0.059) (0.049) (0.059)
H(-1) -0.144 -0.064 -0.149 -0.085 -0.155 -0.092 -0.009 -0.152
(0.130) (0.207) (0.133) (0.208) (0.147) (0.235) (0.181) (0.259)
N 657 613 583 540 465 427 335 310
N countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
N instruments 83 78 73 56
AB1 statistics 0 0 0 0
AB2 statistics 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.83
Hansen statistics 0.93 0.66 0.48 0.17
Note: second and third lags (respectively second to fourth and second to fifth) of democracy and education as instruments 
over periods 1870-2000 and 1900-2000 (resp. 1930-2000 and 1960-2000). Robust standard errors and Windjmeier 
correction for standard errors in BB. Comparable results are obtained with BB estimator when excluding initial democracies. 
All regressions include country and time specific effects. 







Table 6 – Democracy, GDP per Capita and Average Years of Primary Schooling 
 
FE BB FE BB FE BB FE BB
D(-1) 0.668*** 0.649*** 0.679*** 0.755***
(0.076) (0.078) (0.116) (0.156)
Log y(-1) 0.141*** 0.011 0.152*** 0.012 0.140*** -0.010 0.074 -0.093
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.050) (0.042) (0.059) (0.074)
0.045** 0.046** 0.073*** 0.049** 0.083*** 0.064*** 0.090** 0.107***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.036) (0.039)
N 567 560 512 505 424 381 309 307
N countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69
N instruments 79 78 50 36
AB1 statistics 0 0 0 0
AB2 statistics 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.69
Hansen statistics 0.73 0.73 0.12 0.21
Note: third lags of democracy, primary education and log income as instruments. All regressions include country and time specific effects.
1870-2000 1900-2000 1930-2000 1960-2000
Dependent variable is standardized Polity IV index of democracy
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